Trump’s new strategy is not without opposition in US ruling circles, both for its geopolitical priorities and for its tactics. An early indication of this was the 52-47 vote in the US Senate to require Trump to gain approval from Congress before taking any further military action against Venezuela. The involvement of Rand Paul (Kentucky) in instigating this was no surprise, but Republican defectors also included Susan Collins (Maine) who backed the kidnapping of Maduro but said she does not “support committing additional U.S. forces or entering into any long-term military involvement in Venezuela or Greenland without specific congressional authorization.”4

Outside politics, while Trump undoubtedly enjoys considerable support in big business circles, there are important figures who have expressed misgivings. One of the more vocal critics is Jamie Dimon, the chief executive of J P Morgan, the US’s biggest bank and, with a market capitalisation of $899 billion, the world’s 13th largest company. Early in Trump’s presidency he used his annual letter to shareholders to outline what amounted to an alternative foreign policy.5

“If the Western world’s military and economic alliances were to fragment, America itself would inevitably weaken”, he warned, adding that “America First is fine as long as it doesn’t end up being America alone.” On the US’s geopolitical priorities, he said Israel and Ukraine were “the battlefields of freedom” (my emphasis) and that a peace deal with Russia that left Ukraine in a weakened position would prompt Europe to “search for better security arrangements.”

Dimon’s biggest worry, however, was the possibility of the US dollar losing its status as the world’s reserve currency. This was, he said, “the cornerstone of America’s commanding global influence.” It meant that the US was able to borrow $2.5 trillion “in effect…without paying interest” but that it depended on America being “broadly trusted and reliable”,” and on sanctions being used “judiciously” and “generally done in concert with our allies.” There is, he argued, “a correlation between the strength of our economic and military alliances and our status as reserve currency.”

That status has clearly been put at risk by the rise of China and efforts by the BRICS countries to diversify. While the ending of the dollar’s dominant status is not imminent, its erosion is clearly happening by multiple measures: the dollar’s share of foreign exchange reserves has declined from more than 70% to 56% over the last 25 years; the share of gold in foreign exchange reserves has more than doubled from 4% to 9% with China, Russia and Turkey being the largest buyers; the renminbi is estimated to be used in 50% of intra-BRICS trade; and a large and growing proportion of trade in oil and coal is being conducted in the currencies of the countries involved.6

The strength of the dollar has allowed Washington, as Dimon says, to borrow from the rest of the world to fund its budget deficit. Not surprisingly, its possible demise is causing consternation among supporters of US-led Western hegemony generally. The Atlantic Council launched a ‘Dollar Dominance Monitor’ in 2023. The Geneva Centre for Security Policy, which is part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace, has warned that “meaningful de-dollarisation would have profound implications for the global security architecture, reducing the United States’ capacity to fund its military and impose coercive economic pressure.”7

Trump is no less concerned than Dimon about the threat to the dollar. His response, however, is to issue the kind of threats that Dimon sees as injudicious. Shortly after his inauguration, he said: “There is no chance that BRICS will replace the US Dollar in International Trade, or anywhere else, and any Country that tries should say hello to Tariffs, and goodbye to America!”8

Amid the euphoria in the White House after the kidnapping of Maduro, Trump declared on Truth Social that he wants to increase US military spending from $1 trillion in 2026 to $1.5 trillion in 2027 “to allow us to build the ‘Dream Military’ that we have long been entitled to.”9 He thinks the “tremendous income” from tariffs can pay for this, but most estimates suggest that it will not even offset domestic tax cuts he has already made. If that’s the case, funding his wars will require either spending cuts and tax increases or yet more debt. The former will threaten his popularity and the chances of the Republicans winning the mid-terms in November. Growing debt to fund military spending could further undermine the dollar or even trigger a major financial crisis.

Trump acting like a maniac on a mission may in part be because he only has three years left in office but it is also undoubtedly driven by pressure to arrest US decline. The divisions in US ruling circles arise from this singular imperative. Trump and the likes of Dimon and Murphy want the same thing, and their routes to achieving it involve wars. While in the short-term Democrats in Congress can be allies in constraining Trump, a return to their Atlanticism is not going to deliver peace.