The United States’ welcome to the New Year came on 3 January 2026. President Trump announced to the world on social media, ‘The United States of America has successfully carried out a large-scale strike against Venezuela and its leader, President Nicolas Maduro, who has been, along with his wife, captured and flown out of the Country. This operation was done in conjunction with US Law Enforcement. Details to follow.’

On the same day a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry responded, ‘China is deeply shocked by and strongly condemns the US’s blatant use of force against a sovereign state and action against its president. Such hegemonic acts of the US seriously violate international law and Venezuela’s sovereignty, and threaten peace and security in Latin America and the Caribbean region. China firmly opposes it. We call on the US to abide by international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and stop violating other countries’ sovereignty and security.’1

The United States (US) attack on Venezuela is the culmination of a direct military build-up in the Caribbean since CNN reported on August 15 that the US had sent 4,000 Navy and Marine personnel along with a fleet that included guided-missile destroyers and submarine assault vessels. On September 13, F-35 fighter jets arrived in Puerto Rico, stationed at a naval base that was defunct for more than two decades and on October 24, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth ordered the deployment of the US Navy’s largest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald Ford, to the Caribbean. The carrier hosts about 5,000 troops over 75 aircraft with attack, support and surveillance capabilities. On October 26, a US destroyer with Marine personnel docked in Trinidad and Tobago, seven miles off the coast of Venezuela. The US and Trinidadian government said it was for a training exercise as part of bilateral military cooperation.2

Al Jazeera reported on 4 January, ‘The Trump administration has struck at least 32 vessels, killing about 115 people in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific Ocean since September.’ In refutation of Trump’s claim that Venezuelan oil belongs to the US, Al Jazeera also had this to say, ‘In 1975, after decades seeking greater control of its oil resources, Venezuela nationalised its oil industry. “Trump’s claim that Venezuela has stolen oil and land from the US is baseless,” Francisco Rodriguez, a Venezuelan economist at the University of Denver, told the Washington Post. “The US was much more interested in having Venezuela be a provider of oil – relatively cheap oil – than to have a production collapse in Venezuela,” Rodriguez added.’3 That’s quite apart from the fact that Venezuela’s oil belongs to Venezuela.

Steve Howell reports that the attack on Venezuela involved 150 aircraft launched “from 20 different bases on land and at sea across the Western Hemisphere”.4 This is a reminder that the United States has some 750 military bases outside the US itself, and that US military spending is 37% of the world total according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2024 fact sheet. China comes next with 12%, and Russia third with 5.5%.

This military aggression is typical of the US’ response to the development of global alternatives to its dominance, the dollar, and US-dominated international bodies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank which heavily interfere in countries’ politics and economics when lending money. In particular China, with its powerful economy and stance of win-win, mutually beneficial relations with other countries, and non-interference in countries’ internal affairs offers a real alternative and in that sense a real threat. Bodies like the China-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) forum foster mutual relations and have made the region China’s second-most important trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $518 billion in 2024.5

It goes without saying that progressive governments like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba have found in China a reliable ally which seeks mutually advantageous cooperation. In Venezuela there has been cooperation in sectors like energy, telecommunications and infrastructure. Nicaragua has cooperated in areas like agriculture, health and digital connectivity. Cuba and China have cooperated in biotechnology, medicine, renewable energy, 5G telecommunications, and port infrastructure development. However, because of the ever-tightening US blockade, even Chinese companies can be hindered from freely operating with Cuba for fear of US retaliation.

On New Year’s Eve Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered his 2026 New Year message through China Media Group and the internet. He marked the completion of the 14th Five Year Plan for economic and social development, highlighting the key improvements in the living standards of the Chinese people, and looked forward to the 15th Plan which starts in 2026.

In sharp contrast to the United States greeting the new year with its attack against Venezuela, Xi also spoke about China in the world, ‘We continue to embrace the world with open arms. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Tianjin and the Global Leaders’ Meeting on Women were very successful; and island-wide special customs operations were launched in the Hainan Free Trade Port. To better address climate change, China announced new Nationally Determined Contributions. After announcing the three global initiatives on development, security, and civilization, I put forward the Global Governance Initiative to promote a more just and equitable global governance system. The world today is undergoing both changes and turbulence, and some regions are still engulfed in war. China always stands on the right side of history, and is ready to work with all countries to advance world peace and development and build a shared future for humanity.’6

On 9 December, in accordance with the President’s Global Governance Initiative, the Group of Friends of Global Governance, consisting of 43 countries, was inaugurated and issued a joint statement. From Latin America and the Caribbean, the group included Antigua and Barbuda, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The group also invited all like-minded United Nations member states to join. Highlighting the founding of the United Nations (UN) 80 years ago and committing to upholding its legacy, the statement emphasised ‘respecting sovereignty equality, territorial integrity and political independence of any state, and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other states, and refraining in our international relations from the threat or use of force.’ The statement continued, ‘We recognise that the world is entering a new period of turbulence and transformation, as the UN and the multilateral system face increasing strain and global governance deficits continue to widen. We express particular concern over the serious under-representation of the Global South, the erosion of the authority of international law, including the purposes and principles of the UN Charter…We welcome the Global Governance Initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping and its five core concepts – sovereign equality, international rule of law, multilateralism, a people-centred approach and taking real actions.7

Brazil, Latin America’s most populous country with 212, 812,405 inhabitants in 2025, is a founding member of the cross-continental partnership of BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa - now BRICS+ since it has expanded to include 11 members and 10 associate states, including Bolivia and Cuba. BRICS+ represents around 50% of the world’s population and 43.93% of global gross domestic product (GDP) in purchasing power parity terms. (8) In 2025, Brazil simultaneously chaired the G20 and BRICS+. COP30 in Belem, under Brazilian auspices, highlighted the Amazon and climate justice as central features of the BRICS agenda. Brazil used its BRICS presidency to advance the New Development Bank (NDB) into operation, promoting the use of local currencies in trade between members. It also launched an initiative for food and climate security in the Global South. None of this can have come as music to the ears of the US government.8

Argentina is Latin America’s fourth most populous country with 45,851,378 inhabitants. The United States, which is quick to raise accusations of electoral interference by other countries, did just that before the mid-term elections in October 2025. In a low turnout, and despite low popularity as a result of a corruption scandal and two years of austerity, President Javier Milei, originally elected in 2023, gained 64 of the 127 lower house seats and 13 of the 24 Senate seats that were contested. While he still does not have a majority in Congress, it will be easier for him to push through policies like loosening the labour laws, and altering the taxation and pensions systems. This result followed only weeks after Milei’s party suffered a landslide defeat in provincial elections in Buenos Aires, a defeat which prompted US President Donald Trump to offer a $40 billion loan to help stabilise the Argentine peso provided the electorate showed their support for Milei in the mid-term elections. In addition he announced a plan to buy Argentine beef, even though this was unpopular with US farmers.

In the run up to the elections, China came into the picture. In September, the Argentinian government lowered export taxes on soya beans and several other products to increase foreign sales and stabilise the peso. US farmers had been unable to export soya beans to China since May as a result of US trade tariffs and China’s response. The value of Argentine soya exports to China between January and August had risen by more than $700 million. Shortly after Trump announced the loan, a leaked message exchange between US government officials labelled Argentina’s actions unfair to US farmers, and Argentina at once reimposed export taxes on soya beans. On 13 November, the US and Argentina signed a trade deal which provides Argentina with ‘preferential market access’ for certain US exports.

This turn to the US contrasts with the policy of Milei’s predecessor Alberto Fernandez who secured a second financial relief package, this time of $6.5 billion, from China in 2023. At the time Fernandez tweeted, ‘Every time we went through difficult times Xi Jinping’s government was very generous and attentive to our needs.’

Argentina is the largest debtor to the IMF and currently owes it more than $41 billion. The repayment terms of the US loan have not been made public. Milei’s neoliberal government will no doubt make the people pay the price. In the words of Matt Barlow, an expert in international political economy at the University of Glasgow, “Inflation is still high, unemployment is rising, the cost of living is difficult for a lot of people, and that’s before any of these changes to labour laws come in. People are feeling the pinch and Argentina has a strong history of social mobilisation.”

Experts also cast doubt on whether Trump’s $40 billion will solve Argentina’s problems. Economist Paul Krugman points out that Argentina has defaulted three times on sovereign debt since 2001 and predicts that investors will ‘sell their Argentine assets at inflated prices, after which the peso will promptly fall again.’

In 2024, Milei signed agreements with the Biden administration to facilitate investments in Argentina’s mining sector. However, realisation of these plans is hindered by Argentina’s federal governance scheme, where provincial governors control their mining resources, and by the inability of the government – and presumably the unwillingness of the US – to provide the infrastructure to connect Argentina’s mines in remote areas to processing and export facilities.

It should be added that military cooperation with China has been replaced with purchase of US-made jets and armoured vehicles, and that Milei has applied to join NATO as a Global Partner. An agreement between Argentina’s National Anti-Terrorism Centre and the FBI to enhance collaboration on money laundering and develop joint training centres coincided with the announcement of the $40 billion loan.910

Chile comes seventh in terms of population in Latin America, with 19,859,921 inhabitants (after Venezuela in sixth place, with over 28 million people). In December 2025 Chile elected Jose Antonio Kast as the next president. He won with more than 58% of the vote, beating the left-wing coalition candidate Jeanette Jara, in the first presidential election in Chile where voting was mandatory and registration automatic for those eligible. The BBC described Kast as ‘far right-wing’, adding, ‘Kast’s victory in Chile follows a string of elections in Latin America that have shifted the region to the Right in recent years – including in Argentina, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and El Salvador.’11

Nevertheless, China has not given up on Chile, and has stayed true to its policy of non-interference in internal affairs. On 22 December Xinhua reported that Chinese President Xi Jinping had congratulated Kast on his election, and continued, ‘Xi pointed out that Chile is the first South American country to have established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, and the two countries have always adhered to mutual respect, equality, mutual benefit and win-win cooperation…Xi said he places great importance on the growth of China-Chile relations and is ready to work with President-elect Kast to carry forward traditional friendship, elevate the China-Chile comprehensive strategic partnership to new heights, and deliver more benefits to the two peoples.’12

As Martin Brown put it in The Diplomat, ‘China controls approximately two-thirds of Chile’s energy sector through mainly financial acquisitions of companies operating in the region. Also, as of 2023, China bought just under 40 per cent of Chilean exports. The next largest export destination – the United States – was well behind, accounting for just 15 per cent of Chile’s total exports.’ He continued, ‘As of 2024, Chile and China’s bilateral trade was worth an estimated $37.8 billion. That year, Chile’s exports to China were primarily made up of minerals…Of these minerals, the most prominent is copper, with Chile exporting £5.5 billion- worth of copper to China. Chile holds an estimated 23% of the world’s reserves in copper, and as of 2024 produced 24% of the world’s copper, signifying the importance of China as a stable buyer. In 2005, China’s Minmetals Corporation signed a 50-50 joint venture with Codelco, Chile’s state-owned copper producer, for £550 million. This venture would ensure China with 55,000 tons of copper for more than 15 years.’ Not surprisingly ‘Kast aims to open Codelco to private capital…selling non-core assets to pay Codelco’s debts. Chinese firms would likely be keen to take part in the bidding.’

Brown outlines other aspects of Chile-China cooperation. ‘In 2024 Valparaiso [Chile’s largest port] also exported 31 per cent of its cargo to Asia – primarily China. Chile has plans to expand the port, which is owned by the state company EMPORCHI.’ China’s Belt and Road approach is to invest in superstructure, and this is not confined to Chile. Chinese-built Chancay port in Peru can handle Ultra Large Container Vessels (ULCVs), unlike Chilean ports, and the new ‘Chancay Express’ connects the Chilean ports of Lirquen and San Antonio to Peru’s port. Shipping times for Chilean exports to China are reduced from 35 days to 23 and costs are cut by 30%. In fact, Chancay is a vital transport hub for the whole of Latin America.13

Trade relations with a stable, planned economy like that of China are clearly in the interests of Latin American countries. But will the US government under Trump succeed in disrupting this peaceful development by a combination of promises, threats and actual force?